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Abstract
To explain attributions of responsibility for acci-

dents, an information processing model was proposed as
an alternative to the "defensive hypothesis".

According

to this alternative model, the predictability of harmful

consequences and not the severity of obtained outcomes is
the single most important determinant of the extent of

attributed responsibility.

To simultaneously test the

predictions of both the defensive hypothesis and the information processing model, subjects read brief accounts
of situations in which the prior probability of an acci-

dent and the severity of obtained consequences was

orthogonally varied.

Subjects were then asked to assign

responsibility to the actors described in each story.
Results were consistent with the predictions of the alter-

native model but showed no support for the defensive
hypothesis.

These data suggest that the information

processing approach, which emphasizes the estimated prior

predictability of harm, provides an interpretive trameworK
for analyzing attributional judgments without relying on

defensive interpretations
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The general theory behind the attribution of respon-

sibility to other people for their behaviors and outcomes
has evolved from Heider's

(1958)

"naive analysis of action"

which describes the process by which individuals infer
causality for events.

According to this analysis, the

average man acts like an amateur scientist to test the

plausibility of various causal explanations for events.

While this process is orderly and "scientific" (Kelley,
1967), it alone cannot predict the attributions made to

others.

The more fundamental determinant of assignments of

responsibility, according to Heider, is the particular in-

terpretation of the term "responsibility" the observer
chooses to adopt.
Heider (1958, Chapter

4)

suggested that there are five

distinct ways of interpreting responsibility.

The first

three of these ways involve unintentional outcomes, while
the last two pertain to intentional consequences.

most primitive level (Association)

person is held

a

,

At the

responsible for any action that is merely connected with
him.

At the second level

(Commission)

,

the person is

viewed as responsible for any action he causes, even though
he could not have foreseen the consequences of his actions.

At the third level

(Foreseeability

)

,

one is held responsible

only for those consequences he should have foreseen.
the fourth level

(Intentionality)

,

a

At

person is responsible

only for those effects he foresaw and intended.

At the

final level

(Justification)

,

a

person is excused from

responsibility even for consequences he intended if the
circumstances were such that anyone would have acted as he
did.

Heider suggests there is a developmental progression

through these five levels from primitive attributions which
ignore intentions to more differentiated attributions which
take into account several factors in the situation, including the intentions of the actor.

These levels were thought

to correspond, in part, to Piaget's stages of moral develop-

ment; nevertheless, Heider recognized that even mature

adults often make primitive attributions.

To account for

these, he suggested that the selection of a causal attribu-

tion can be influenced by motivational biases of the observer
Recently, considerable interest has been directed to
the motivational biases in attributions to which Heider

referred.

Level

2

(Commission)

and Level

3

(Foreseeability

have been the focal point of this interest because the

specification of levels of attributions makes it clear that
the
assignments of responsibility are very dependent upon
or
extent to which the actor is viewed as having foreseen,
of his
having the ability to foresee, the consequences
of
From these empirical investigations the theory
action.
the most indefensive attribution has emerged as one of
which assignments
fluential explanations of the process by

of responsibility are made.

Walster's 1966 experiment was the first and the most
influential of many attempts to test the assumption that

attributions of responsibility are affected by observers'
self-interests.

Walster hypothesized that the need to

assign responsibility for an accident increases with its
severity.

In her study,

subjects were presented with the

description of an accident in which

a

person's unattended

car rolls down a hill because of a mechanical failure of

the brakes.

Subjects were asked to indicate the extent to

which the car's owner was responsible for the accident.

Consistent with her predictions, Walster found that more
personal responsibility was attributed as the accidental

consequences of the mishap became more serious.
interpreted this finding as evidencing
attributions.

Walster

motivated bias in

a

According to this interpretation, the reali-

zation that chance happenings can occur over which one has
no control is threatening.

Consequently,

a

person will

protect himself from acknowledging that he too could be
involved in such an unfortunate event by attributing more

personal responsibility to the actor in

a

serious accident.

Other researchers (McKillip, 1972; Shaver, 1970a,
1970b;

Shaver and Carroll, 1970) have extended the defen-

sive hypothesis to suggest that attributed responsibility
and the
is affected by the relevance of the situation

similarity between actor and observer.

According to their

he too could be
reasoning, the observer's need to deny that

held responsible for a similar accident is achieved by

assigning less responsibility to actors in relevant situations as outcomes become more serious.

This tendency is

enhanced when the perpetrator is similar to the observer.
Reported results, however, have not provided unequivocal support for this defensive interpretation.

In

Walster's original study, the obtained difference between
attributions of responsibility when the accident resulted
in mild damage to the car and when bystanders were severely

injured by the rolling car was not significant for female
subjects.

Furthermore, assignments of responsibility were

similar when the car was destroyed (moderate consequence)
and when bystanders were injured

consequence)

.

(a

relatively more severe

The other investigations of motivated biases

in attributions have also not supported the defensive in-

terpretation, and replications of Walster's study have

generally failed to show consistent effects of severity on

attributions of responsibility (Crinklaw and Vidmar, 1971;
Shaver,

1970a, 1970b; Shaw and Skolnick, 1971; Stokols and

Schopler, 1973; Walster, 1967).

Methodological Inconsistencies in Previous Research
may reflect
The inconsistent and often conflicting results

relationship
methodological inconsistencies which obscure the
severity.
between attributed responsibility and outcome
that the unsucMedway and Lowe (1975), for example, suggest

cessful replications of Walster's results may have been due
in part to the absence of theoretical prerequisites neces-

sary for the occurrence of defensive attributions.

Because

several of the above studies manipulated improbable out-

comes in atypical circumstances, the criterion of high

subject involvement (Heider, 1958; Jones and Davis, 1965)

may not have been satisfied.

Citing some empirical evi-

dence (Shaver, 1970a; Chaikin and Darley, 1973) suggesting
that identification or perceived similarity with the harm-

doer reduces blaming responses from observers, Ross and

DiTecco (1975) argue that inconsistencies in empathy in-

ducing instructions or perceived similarity manipulations

may also account for some of the conflicting results.
Similarly, Vidmar and Crinklaw (1974) contend that many
of the experiments on attribution of responsibility opera-

tionally created "inferential sets"

(Jones and Thibaut,

1958) which were inappropriate in tests of defensive at-

tributions

.

Fishbein and Ajzen (1973) have suggested that the

conflicting results in these studies may be due to subjects'

uncertainty about the response required of them.
to Fishbein and Ajzen,

Heider*

s

According

two dimensions or factors underlie

levels of responsibility.

The first factor is

the developmental or response level of the observer.

The

occurs.
second is the behavioral context in which the action

Assignment of responsibility is

a joint

function of both

these factors such that when the response level of the

judgment is specified (as it is by the judge in jury trials)
the observer must examine the behavioral context in order
to attribute responsibility.

Alternatively, when the con-

textual level is specified, the response level is deter-

mined solely by the observer (Shaw and Reitan, 1969;
Shaw and Sulzer, 1964).

Fishbein and Ajzen (1973) argue

that the inconclusive results of most studies dealing with
the attribution of responsibility are not surprising since

neither the response level nor the contextual level of the
judgments has been specified for the subjects.

Because

subjects are given no instructions, their decisions about

responsibility may involve any of the five response levels
and unpredictable results between studies are to be expected.

Fishbein and Ajzen 's criticisms point out again the
ambiguity of dependent measures of responsibility.

In

his analysis, Heider emphasized that perceptions of respon-

sibility were fundamentally moral judgments.

Many of the

attribution studies used dependent measures which could be
interpreted as indices of legal responsibility (Crinklaw
and Vidmar, 1971; Shaver, 1970a, 1970b; Walster, 1966).

While laws supposedly reflect moral codes, legal responsibility and moral responsibility are not always equivalent.
ensure that
In empirical investigations it is necessary to
actor's
dependent measures reflect subjects* judgments of the

knowledge of legal
mo ral responsibility and not simply their
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sanctions.

For example, in Walster's

subjects were presented with

a

(1966)

original study

taped description of a

stimulus person and of the accident which involved his car.

The car rolled down a hill because the brake cable broke.

Walster's prediction, partially confirmed by the obtained
results, was that subjects would attribute more respon-

sibility when the consequences of the accident were serious
rather than minor, even though the car's owner had no control over the severity of the accident.

Walster inter-

preted these findings as evidence for ego-motivated biases
in the attribution process.

However, the same finding is explainable by assuming
that subjects understand that legal liability, and compen-

sation demanded for negligent conduct, increases as the

extent of the damage incurred increases.

Both morally and

legally one is responsible for any consequences which
accrue because of his irresponsible act.

In Walster's

study, subjects perhaps judged the stimulus person negli-

gent for operating a vehicle with defective brakes.

He

is therefore responsible for any consequences which occur

because of defective brakes.

Legal compensation, but not

necessarily moral responsibility, increase with the
severity of the accident.

A confounding of moral culpa-

responsibility
bility and legal liability in measures of
by Walster
is illustrated by other findings reported

(1966

greater
Although "responsibility" increased with severity,

8

carelessness of behavior prior to the accident was not
attributed to the stimulus person as the outcome of the
accident became more serious.

Thus, the failure to employ

dependent measures which precisely distinguish moral from
legal definitions of responsibility may be another problem

which accounts for some of the discrepancies in reported
results.

Moreover, since the positive relationship between

severity of consequences and attributed responsibility is

predicted both by legal codes and by the defensive hypothesis, empirical findings in accordance with Walster's

interpretation may be open to alternative explanations.
Such findings may simply reflect, if imprecise measures
are employed, subjects' knowledge of legal norms, rather
than a defensive reaction on their part.

While it may be that inconsistent results may reflect

methodological inconsistencies, the conflicting results
also tend to cast doubt upon the validity of the defensive

hypothesis itself.

The model proposed here rests upon the

assumption that observers are fairly rational processors
of available information and that their attributions of

personal responsibility are not systematically distorted
by motivational or emotional biases.

A Rational Model of Attributions of Responsibility
responsibility
Heider (1958) defined attributions of
as moral judgments.

If a person is to be evaluated as

assessed against
morally good or bad, his behavior must be

some standard of conduct.

The standards which dictate

appropriate behaviors in situations have, according to
Heider, two characteristics:

Different people should

perceive the same demands in a given situation, and,
demands should manifest themselves across situations.
These two characteristics of moral standards, consensual

validity and cross-situational consistency, represent the
major criteria for any external or "objective" attribution (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1971).

It is not surprising,

therefore, that moral standards often take on the quality
of objective reality rather than simply subjective per-

ceptions on the part of observers.
The consistency manifested in moral judgments (most

adults can agree whether an action in
tion is morally correct)

a

particular situa-

suggests that there are situa-

tional parameters which are taken into account by observers
to guide their judgments.

The defensive interpretation

implies that the important parameters are

obtained consequences,
and, c)

b)

a)

the severity of

the relevance of the situation,

the perceived similarity between actor and observer.

In contrast,

the model proposed here argues that quite

different parameters are important.

According to this for-

harmdoer
mulation, the assignment of responsibility to a
judgments which begins
is the result of a chain of rational
and is largely
with a consideration of the behavior itself,
which
independent of the severity of any consequences

actually ensues because of that behavior.
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Judging a person as "responsible" for an accident

means that he has behaved "irresponsibly".

That is, the

necessary condition for the attribution of personal
"responsibility" to an actor is the attribution of "ir-

responsibility" to his action.

Furthermore, acts can be

judged as responsible or irresponsible regardless of or

prior to their actual outcomes.

For example, most ob-

servers would probably agree that driving at night without

headlights is an irresponsible act.

Their judgments about

this act do not depend upon or necessitate the observation
of a subsequent accident.

This ability to judge acts,

independent of their consequences, suggests that there are

parameters of the behavior, in the context in which it
occurs, which define its responsibility or irresponsibility

According to the reasoning proposed here, these same parameters, in turn, greatly influence the extent of personal

responsibility assigned to an actor.

Whereas the defen-

sive hypothesis supposes that the predominant contributor
of
to attributional judgments of this kind is the severity

obtained outcomes, this model argues that outcome severity
moral
itself plays a negligible part in the ascription of

responsibility
An Expected-Value Analysis of Behaviors
number of foreAny action may be viewed as having a
a probability of
has
which
of
each
consequences,
seeable

11

occurrence and

valence or value (cf

a

.

,

Edwards,. 1954).

The irresponsibility of an action can be defined and cal-

culated as the total expected value of the anticipated

outcomes associated with that act.

With respect to acci-

dental outcomes, the specific concern of this study, an
action has a probability of leading to an accident (negatively valued consequence)

,

as well as a probability of

producing intended outcomes (positively valued consequences)
In other words, an action has a probability of the occur-

rence of an accident, p(a), and a probability of its nonoccurrence, p(a).

The valence or value

(v)

of the accident

is defined by the probabilities and valences of subsequent

outcomes which are contingent upon the occurrence of the
accident.

For example, the expected value of building

a

house near a river involves an initial estimate of the

probability that the river will flood.

The valence of that

accident is defined by the probabilities and severities of
the outcomes which may occur if the river floods (e.g.

the destruction of the house and/or injury to the family)

.

The irresponsibility and general evaluation of the behavior
can thus be defined as follows:

Total expected-value of a behavior = p(a) v(a)

+ p(a)

v(a)

where
p(a)

= probability of the accident,

as anti-

cipated by an observer
p(a)

= probability that no accident will occur

= value of the accident,

v(a)

as anticipated

by an observer
= value of the non-occurrence of the

v(a)

accident
The value of the accident, v(a), can be further defined in terms of the probabilities and valences of conse-

quences which are contingent upon the occurrence of the

accident
n
XI

=

v(a)

i=l

v(o.)
p(0.)
1
1

where
p (CK

)

v (o^)

Similarly

,

=

probability of the contingent outcomes

= valence or severity of those outcomes

the value of the non-occurrence of the

accident can be specified in terms of the probabilities and
values of the intended positive outcomes which are anti-

cipated from the behavior.

According to this model, the first judgment in the
attribution process is about the irresponsibility of the act
itself, where irresponsibility can be defined in expected-

value terms.

The expected-value formula suggests that an

actor will be held morally responsible for his conduct if
is
the expected-value of the occurrence of an accident

i.e.,
greater than the expected-value of its non-occurrence;

negative.
when the total expected-value of the behavior is
it implies
Since the formula uses expected likelihoods,

that an actor will be excused from responsibility if the

outcomes produced by his act were, from the observer's
point of view, truly accidental; i.e., could not have

reasonably been foreseen.

For the same reason, the model

conforms to the common observation that responsibility can
be assigned or excused regardless of the actual outcomes

which occur.

Since the probability of the accident is of

central importance in the evaluations of behaviors, an
actor may be judged to have behaved irresponsibly when his

action had a high prior probability of producing negative

effects even if the actual consequences of that behavior

were positive.

Probabilistic Bias in Attr ibutional Judgments
Since, according to this model, judgments of moral

responsibility are based, in part, on probability judgments,
the attribution process may be influenced by the biases

found to be associated with probability judgments.

One

such bias which seems to be particularly relevant for at-

tributions of responsibility was reported by Fischhoff
(1975)

.

His results show that knowledge that a specific

outcome has already occurred increases the postdicted
Fischhoff refers to this

likelihood of that outcome.

tendency to perceive reported outcomes as having been more
inevitable as "creeping determinism"

creeping determinism plays
sibility.

a

(p.

288)

.

Perhaps

part in assignments of respon-

If events which occur are perceived,

a

posteriori,

14

to have been more likely simply because they occurred,

more responsibility may be attributed to an actor because,
retrospectively, he should have foreseen the likelihood
of the accident.

In terms of this discussion, hindsight

may mediate the assignment of responsibility by revising
prior odds of occurrences of events.

For example, if an

accident is known to have occurred, the prior probability
of the accident may be postdictively increased as the prior

probability of the accident's non-occurrence is decreased.
From the expected-value formula it can be seen that such
revisions in probabilities decrease the total expectedvalue of the behavior and may thereby mediate the extent of

attributed responsibility.

It should be noted that while

this tendency to regard actual outcomes as more inevitable

once they have occurred represents a bias in the attribution process, it is a probabilistic, rather than an ego-

motivated or defensive, bias.
Effect of Severity of Obtained Consequences
It is important to note that the parameters included

in the expected-value analysis refer to potential, rather

than actual, events.

This information processing model

assigned
argues that the extent of personal responsibility
extent to which
to an actor is determined primarily by the
his act was judged irresponsible.

The model also assumes

can be made on
that a judgment of an act's irresponsibility

15

the basis of the potential outcomes of the behavior, as

anticipated by an observer, and does nor depend upon whatever outcomes actually occur.

For this reason, the pro-

posed model, in contrast to the defensive hypothesis,
suggests that the severity of actually obtained consequences
does not appreciably influence the attribution of responsibility.

However, if the creeping determinism effect

occurs, the severity of obtained consequences may indirectly

influence the extent of personal culpability assigned to
the actor.

Consider the simplest case in which an accident can
produce either of two mutually exclusive outcomes, one

mild and the other severe.

Knowing that the accident

occurred and resulted in one of the two outcomes may lead
to retrospective increases in both the probability of the

accident and the probability of the obtained outcome.

Since

the revised probability estimate is weighted by a severity/

value factor, and since the severity of the serious conse-

quence is, by definition, greater (more negative) than that
of the mild outcome, the expected value of behaviors which

result in severe consequences may be lower than the ex-

pected value of acts which produce mild outcomes.

Because,

according to this analysis, the extent of attributed perexpected
sonal responsibility is based, in part, on the

therefore
value of the behavior, more responsibility may
serious
be assigned to actors whose behavior produces

16

consequences.

While this information processing model,

like the defensive hypothesis, might therefore predict

greater responsibility assigned for severe than for mild
consequences, the reasoning behind the prediction is

fundamentally different in the two models.

This analysis

suggests that the severity effect obtains because of

revisions in the probabilities of outcomes and not because
of the severity, per se, of those outcomes.

The severity

effect, therefore, need not be interpreted as a manifestation of observers' defensive tendencies.

Summary
A summary of the main points and predictions of this

alternative mode] may be helpful.

The attribution of per-

sonal responsibility to an actor is postulated to begin

with and thus to correlate with the attribution of irresponsibility to his action.

Personal responsibility; i.e.,

moral culpability, is attributed to actors who engage in

irresponsible acts.

Judgments about the irresponsibility of

one's behavior may be part of a general subjective evaluation
they
of the action in the context in which it occurs, but

can be defined in expected-value terms.

According to an

the
expectcd-value analysis, an act is irresponsible if

given the
expected value of the occurrence of an accident,
of its nonbehavior, is greater than the expected value

occurrence.

of the act
Thus, both the general evaluation

17

and the extent to which it is deemed irresponsible are pre-

dicted to correlate with its expected value.
The attribution of irresponsibility to an act and the

attribution of responsibility to an actor are assumed to be
related because both are predicted to be influenced by the
same parameter, the probability that the actor's conduct

will lead to or produce an accident.
The defensive hypothesis predicts that the severity
of obtained consequences significantly affects the extent
of attributed responsibility to actors.

In contrast,

this

model predicts that severity of actual outcomes influences

neither the attributions made to acts nor to actors except

indirectly when the creeping determinism effect produces

postdictive increases in the probabilities of obtained
consequences
A secondary interest of this study concerns Fischhoff's

notion of "creeping determinism".

His findings suggest

that observer's knowledge that an accident has already

occurred will increase the postdicted likelihood of the

occurrence of the accident as well as the likelihood of the
contingent outcome which ensues.

If this retrospective

revision in probabilities were to obtain, it would decrease
and, in
the total expected value of the actor's behavior

responsibility
turn, would result in more attributed personal
informed of the
To test this prediction, some subjects were
that
occurrence of the accident while others knew only

a
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potential accident could occur, and their respective at-

tributions were compared.
In the present experiment subjects read a brief ac-

count of a situation in which an accident could potentially
occur.

The prior probability of the accident (Low or High)

outcome knowledge (Informed or Uninformed about whether
the potential accident actually occurred)

,

and outcome

severity (Mild or Severe) were experimentally varied.
the design was a

2

x

2

x 2 factorial.

stories subjects were asked to answer

Thus

After reading the
a

series of questions

designed to measure their assessment of the action itself,
the probabilities and valences of outcomes associated with

that action, and the extent to which they felt that the

perpetrator was or would be responsible for the accident.

METHOD

Stimulus Materials
The principal components of the proposed model of the

attribution of responsibility are the probabilities and
valences of outcomes associated with the actor's behavior.
Pilot subjects were used to generate estimates of these

parameters
Five stories in which an accident could potentially
occur were presented to pilot subjects.

versions of each story.

There were two

The versions differed in that the

19

circumstances in which the behavior occurs was varied.
In one version the actor's behavior was relatively likely
to lead to an accident.

In the other, the situational

factors were such that the same behavior was less likely
to result in an accident.

In both versions the descrip-

tions specified two consequences which could result from
the potential accident, one of relatively mild severity

(property damage or slight injury)

,

the other of a more

serious nature (serious injury or death)

.

The task of the

pilot subjects was to estimate the probabilities and

valences of the outcomes associated with the actor's behavior in each situation.

Subjects were asked first to

estimate the probability that an accident would occur in
the situation and, secondly, to estimate the probabilities
of both the outcomes of the accident.

Lastly, they were

asked to estimate the likelihood that the accident would
not occur.

These measures established the normative prior

probabilities of the events depicted in the stories.

In

order to determine the valence of those events, subjects
rated the desirability of each of the probable outcomes in
the situation.

To ensure that obtained results would not

four
be specific to the details of a particular story,

the pre
different pairs of stories were then selected from
which a
The four stories chosen were those in
test pool.
two versions in
clear difference was perceived between the

the likelihood of an accident.

20

Subjects

A total of 120 subjects participated in the actual
experiment.

The subjects were undergraduates enrolled in

introductory psychology courses who participated in the
study as part of their course requirements.

Procedure
Subjects first were randomly assigned to one of two

experimental conditions.

In one condition

(Low probability),

subjects read descriptions of situations in which the prior

probability of an accident was judged (by pilot subjects)
to be low.

Other subjects (High probability) read the

other version of the same story in which the prior prob-

ability of the accident was relatively high.

One low

probability story, for example, presented subjects with
the following information:

The state of Colorado voted to build a dam on
the Platte river in order to store more water
for the growing city of Denver.

Before the

dam was completed, William Smith and his family
decided to build a house on land they owned_
near the banks of the Platte river, downstream
of the proposed dam site.

Mr.

Smith knew that

if the river flooded before the dam was com-

pleted, it could ruin the house and endanger
the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their
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three children.

On the other hand, Mr. Smith

also knew that the Platte had never flooded

before and that spring rainfall was, on the
average, decreasing every year so it seemed

highly unlikely that the river would flood

again before the dam was built.

With this in

mind, he went ahead and built the house.
In contrast,

the high probability version of the story reads

as follows:

The state of Colorado voted to build a dam on
the Platte river in order to store more water
for the grov/ing city of Denver.

Before the

dam was completed, William Smith and his
family decided to build

a

house on land they

owned near the banks of the Platte river,

downstream of the proposed dam site.

Mr.

Smith knew that the Platte river had flooded
three times during the past eight years be-

cause of heavy spring rains and meltina snow.
If the river flooded again before the dam was

completed, it could ruin the house and en-

danger the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Smith and
their three children.

Mr.

Smith also knew

that the spring rainfall was, on the average,

decreasing every year and that the Platte
hadn't flooded since 1973 so it probably

wouldn't flood again before the dam was built.
With this in mind, he went ahead and built
the house.

The second variable of interest is outcome knowledge.

Subjects within each probability condition (Low or High)
were divided randomly into two groups.

Subjects assigned

to the Informed group were told that an accident did, in

fact, occur.

They also knew which of the two consequences

of the accident occurred.
group)

Other subjects (Uninformed

received no information about the actual consequences

of the actor's behavior but knew that an accident could

occur and could result in either of the two consequences of

differing severity.
The third manipulated variable concerns the severity
of outcomes.

Subjects within each outcome-knowledge con-

dition were further divided into two groups.

Some subjects

in the Informed group read that the accident occurred and

produced the mildly severe outcome.

The remaining subjects

in the Informed group read that thu consequences of the

actor's behavior were more serious.
the above example,

To illustrate, using

Informed subjects in the Mild outcome

group read:
A few months after the Smith family moved into
their new home, and before the dam was completed, the Platte river flooded.

Although

flood,
none of the Smiths were injured in the

the house was ruined.

Informed subjects in the Severe outcome condition received
the following information

A few months after the Smith family moved into
their new home, and before the dam was completed, the Platte river flooded.

The house

was ruined and two members of the Smith family

were critically injured as the flood swept
through their house.

Subjects in these groups were asked to judge how responsible or irresponsible was the behavior and how responsible
(morally blame-worthy) was the actor for the consequences

produced by his behavior

.

Within the Uninformed condition

half the subjects were asked to evaluate the behavior and

assign personal responsibility to the actor if the mild

outcome were to occur.

The other half of the Uninformed

subjects were asked to make the same judgments of respon-

sibility if the more serious outcome were realized.

Dependent Variables
The principal dependent variables of interest are the

assignments of responsibility to actions and to actors.

Attributions made to actions were assessed by an

8

point

responsible
scale which asked subjects simply to rate how
story.
or irresponsible was the behavior in each

Attri-

made on
butions of personal responsibility to actors were
to
point scale ranging from "totally responsible"
This measure explicitly asked
"not at all responsible".

an

8

for a judgment of moral and personal responsibility and

not a decision of legal liability.

Each subject also rated the extent to which the

actor's conduct was appropriate or prudent in the situaThe appropriateness measure was generated from

tion.

subjects' responses to five semantic differential items.

Each subject was asked to locate the actor's behavior
along the following dimensions, each anchored at the extremes:

safe-unsafe, wise-unwise, good-bad, morally

right-morally wrong, justif ied-un j ustif ied

.

The sum of

these responses comprised an index of subjects' evaluations of the perpetrator's act, with higher scores re-

flecting more negative evaluations.
In order to calculate the expected value of the be-

haviors, each subject was asked to estimate the proba-

bilities associated with the potential events described
in each of the four stories.

Uninformed subjects made

straight-forward predictions of the likelihoods of both
the occurrence and, later in the questionnaire, the non-

occurrence of the accident.

They also estimated the like

lihood of the two conditional outcomes in each situation.

Informed subjects were asked to ignore their knowledge of
likelihoods
the actual consequences and to estimate these
"as

(they)

would have had (they) not known" the particula

outcome in the situations.
these potenti
The valence or desirability of each of

outcomes was also solicited of subjects.

RESULTS

Manipulation Checks
The probability manipulation sought to construct

situations in which the actor's behavior or neglect
likely or unlikely to produce an accident.

v/as

Subjects were

asked to estimate, from 0% to 100%, the probability that
an accident would occur.

Another measure allowed subjects

to estimate the probability that an accident would not

occur.

Subjects' estimates of both these parameters sug-

gest that the probability manipulation was accurately
perceived.

Subjects who read the low probability versions

of the stories judged the accident to be less likely

(X =

35%)

than those who read the high probability versions

(X =

63%; F = 187.27, df = 1/112, p < .01).

This prob-

ability estimate was, understandably, influenced by the
situational context.

This influence was evidenced by a

main effect of the different stories on the probability
estimates.

Furthermore, a story x probability interaction

was also obtained:

although the probability of harm was

judged to be significantly greater in the high probability
probversions, the difference between estimates in the two

ability versions, differed across the four stories.

Table

1

story by
presents the average likelihood estimates for each

subjects in each experimental group.

It might be noted

affect estimates
that the outcome knowledge variable did not
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of the likelihood of the accident.

Subjects who knew

the actual chain of events in each story did not assign a

higher probability to the accident than those who did not.
The analysis of variance did reveal a significant

second order interaction of story x probability x outcome
information.

In three of the four stories the difference

in likelihood estimates between the low and high versions

was greater when subjects knew the actual outcome in the

situation than when they did not.

It is unclear why

estimates of Story #4 deviated from the predominant pattern of interaction depicted in Figure

1.

Subjects' estimates of the likelihood that the acci-

dent would not occur also showed the influence of the prob-

ability manipulation.

The average estimate by subjects who

read the low probability versions was 63%, while those who
read the high probability versions judged the likelihood
of the non-occurrence of the accident to be 39%
df = 1/112, p < .01).

(F =

114.49,

With the exception of the second

order interaction which was not replicated, the probability
of the non-occurrence of the accident exhibited the same

main effects and interactions as were obtained for the
estimates of the occurrence of the accident.

1

Logically, the probability of the occurrence of an accident and the probability of its non-occurrence should
Our results show that while these estimates
equal 1.0.
were highly inversely related (r = -.70), they were not
perfect complements of one another. The analyses reported
below used the separate estimates of each parameter
provided by subjects.
1

28
f

FIGURE

1

Interaction of Story x Probability x

Outcome Information on Estimates of the
Likelihoods of the Accidents

Difference in
Likelihood Estimates between
Low and High
Probability
Conditions

Uninformed

Informed
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In addition to these measures of the probability of

an accident, subjects also estimated the likelihoods of

the accident's mutually exclusive outcomes, as described
in each story.

These probabilities were measured contin-

gent upon the occurrence of the accident.

For example,

the probability that the actor's home would be damaged
(Mild outcome)

or that his family would be injured

(Severe

outcome) depended upon the occurrence of the flood.

Each

subject estimated the likelihood of both the mild and
severe outcomes, if the accident happened.

Since the

probability manipulation sought only to vary the probability of the accident, the likelihoods of the contingent
outcomes should not be affected.

Analyses of variance

were performed on estimates of the likelihood of both the
No significant

mild and the severe contingent outcomes.

effects were obtained with respect to the mild outcome.

Estimates of its likelihood were substantially the same
in both low and high probability conditions
54%,

(X =

52% and

respectively).

The likelihood of the severe outcome

v/as,

influenced by the probability manipulation.

however,

Subjects who

read the low probability versions of the stories judged
the severe outcome to be less probable

(X

those who read the high probability versions
F = 10.50,

df = 1/112, p

<.01).

47%)
(X =

than
54%;

This unexpected finding

of the initial
suggests that variations in the likelihood

accident affected the likelihood of the severe contingent
outcome, but not the likelihood of the mild outcome.

It

should be noted that although the probability manipulation

created differences in the likelihood of the severe consequence, the magnitude of this effect depended upon the

particular story in which it was embedded, as evidenced
by the significant probability x story interaction.

dividual comparisons of the cell means (Table

2)

In-

revealed

that the severe outcome was viewed as significantly less
likely in the low probability versions of only two of the
stories, but of about equal probability in the other two
stories.

This interaction is depicted in Figure

The

2.

summary of the analysis of variance is presented in Table
3.

The valence of consequences manipulation was accurately
perceived.
(X =

p

6.74)

< .01).

Severe consequences were judged less desirable
than mild consequences

(X =

5.10; t = 17.81,

To determine if the undesirability of the out-

comes was affected by other variables, analyses of variance

were performed.

The perceived severity of the mild out-

come varied across the four stories; some mild outcomes
were, of course, judged more serious than others.

The

analysis also revealed a story x probability interaction
for the mild outcome.

In three of the four stories,

the

desirable
mild outcome was viewed as significantly less
than when it
when the probability of an accident was low
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FIGURE

2

Extimated Likelihood of the
Severe Consequence as

a

Function

of the Probability of an Accident

Across Different Stories

.7
.

63
.

.6

Estimated
Likel ihood
of Severe
Consequence

.

5

.

4

.

3

62

.2
.

1

Low

Probability

High

TABLE

3

Summary of Analysis of Variance
of Likelihood of the Severe Consequence

Source

df

no

T?
r

Probability

(P)

1

•

Outcome
Information

(I)

1

.1763

3.074

1

.1687

2.942

Pxl

1

.0440

.7687

PxV

1

.033

.581

IxV

1

.0187

.326

IxPxV

1

.0003

.005

Between Groups
Error

112

.0573

Story

3

1.3229

46.170**

SxP

3

.4034

14.081**

Sxl

3

.0046

.

SxV

3

.0094

.330

SxIxP

3

.0128

.4469

SxIxV

3

.0014

.051

SxPxV

3

.039

1.366

SxPxIxV

3

.070

2.448

Error

336

.02865

Valence of
Consequences

** p

(S)

<

.01

(V)

U u Z. ±

ibuy
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was high.

When the probability of the accident is high,

subjects apparently perceive that greater damage or injury

could have occurred and the mild outcome is thus seen as
less severe.

action

Figure

3

shows the pattern of this inter-

.

The analysis of the undesirability of the severe

outcome showed no main effects or interactions.
Primary Analysis
The principal contention of the proposed model is
that the attribution of personal responsibility to an

actor is based upon and influenced by the extent to which
his act is deemed irresponsible.

A preliminary assumption

is that a judgment of the irresponsibility of an action

To

is part of a more general evaluation of that act.

test this assumption, subjects' judgments about the ir-

responsibility of the behavior were correlated with the
five item evaluative index.
.88,

The obtained correlation,

confirms this initial assumption.

More importantly,

perboth the general evaluation of the behavior and its

ceived irresponsibility were found to reflect estimable
and
parameters of the situation; i.e., probabilities

valences.

each of
The expected-value of the behaviors in

to the formula
the four stories was calculated according
related both
presented above (page 10). It was highly

of the act
to the perceived irresponsibility

(r

=

-.54,

FIGURE

3

Perceived Undesirability of the Mild

Consequence as a Function of Probability
and Story

6. 02

Perceived
Undesirability
4.40

—

High

Low

Probability
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measures of responsibility (to actions and to actors) were
submitted to analyses of variance.

Tables

5

and

6

present

the cell means of these dependent measures under each of
the experimental conditions.

The results of the analyses

of variance are presented in Tables

7

and

8.

Both mea-

sures were strongly influenced by the probability manipulation.

An act was judged more irresponsible if it was more

likely to lead to an accident than if it was not
87.58, df = 1/112, p < .01).

=

(F

Likewise, more personal

responsibility was assigned to the actors in the high probability versions of the stories than in the low
40.58, df = 1/112, p

< .01).

(F

=

These findings tend to sup-

port the hypothesis that the probability of harm is

a

central consideration in attributions of responsibility
to persons, and in the perceived irresponsibility of their

actions
Secondly, both measures, like the estimates of prob-

abilities, were uniformly influenced by the context in

which the behavior occurred; i.e.,

a

main effect of the

different stories was obtained.
Third, Figures

4

and

5

show that a similar pattern

in both
of story x probability interaction was obtained

measures.

Although actions were judged more irresponsible,

high proband actors more personally culpable, in the

between
ability versions of each story, the differences

and high versions varied across stories.

Individual
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p

^

.01)

and to the evaluation of the behavior

p < .01).

(r

= -.57,

As the expected value of the behavior decreased

there was a strong tendency to evaluate it more negatively
and to perceive it as more irresponsible.
This correlational evidence confirms the expected

relationship between the attribution of irresponsibility
to an action, the general evaluation of that action, and

its expected value.

The next step in this analysis ex-

amines the relationship between attributions of irrespon-

sibility to actions and attributions of responsibility to
actors.

The predicted relationship between these different

measures of responsibility was obtained

=

(r

.58,

p

<.01).

Attributed personal responsibility was, as expected, also
related to the general negative evaluation of the action
(r

=

.59,

p

<.01), and inversely related, but to

a

lesser extent, to its expected-value (r= -.27, p < .05).

These correlations are presented in Table

4

Having established that the extent of responsibility

assigned to an actor varies directly with the perceived

irresponsibility of the action, it is now possible to
assess the effects of the independent variables on these
attributions.

The proposed model asserts that the ir-

responsibility of the action and the responsibility asinsigned to an actor are related because they are both

the
fluenced by the same variable, the probability of

accident.

To test this prediction, the data for both

38

TABLE

4

Correlations Among Measures of Attributed

Responsibility and Evaluations of the Action

Resp (act)
Resp (act)

Eval (act)

E.V.(act)

1.00

Eval (act)

.

878

-.537

E.V. (act)

Resp (actor)

.

578

-.574
.

592

-.275

Resp (act) = amount of responsibility/irresponsibility

attributed to the action
Eval (act) = general negative evaluation of the action
E.V. (act)

=

Resp (actor)

expected-value of the action
=

amount of personal responsibility attributed
to the actor

39

TABLE

5

Average Amount of Irresponsibility Assigned to
Actions Across Experimental Conditions

Uninformed

Informed

Mild
Outcome

Severe
Outcome

Mild
Outcome

Severe
Outcome

Low

4.48

4.45

4.18

4.73

High

6.25

6.47

5.88

6.20

Probability

TABLE

6

Average Amount of Personal Responsibility Assigned
to Actors Across Experimental Conditions

Uninformed

Probability

Mild
Outcome

Informed

Severe
Outcome

Mild
Outcome

Severe
Outcome

Low

4.92

5.03

4.00

4.05

High

5.65

5.87

5.45

5.60

TABLE

7

Summary of Analysis of Variance
of Attributed Responsibility to the Actor

Source

df

MS

F

Probability

(P)

1

156.408

40.578**

Outcome
Information

(I)

1

42.008

10.898**

1

2.133

Pxl

1

15.408

PxV

1

.300

.077

IxV

1

.133

.034

PxIxV

1

.001

.001

Between Groups
Error

112

Story

3

96.347

45.981**

SxP

3

15.158

7.23**

Sxl

3

.813

.388

SxV

3

1.005

.479

SxPxI

3

3.358

1.602

SxIxV

3

3.161

1.508

SxPxV

3

2.050

.978

SxPxIxV

3

4.594

2.129

Error

336

2,095

Valence of
Consequences

** p

(S)

< .01

(V)

.553

3.997*

3.854

TABLE

8

Summary of Analysis of Variance
of Attributions of Irresponsibility to Actions

Source

df

MS

F

Probability

(P)

1"

Outcome
Information

(I)

1

3.17

.77

1

8.27

2.00

Pxl

1

2.85

.69

IxV

1

3.50

.85

PxV

1

.01

.01

PxIxV

1

1.75

.42

Between Groups
Error

112

4

Story

3

17 . 02

SxP

3

31 17

Sxl

3

5.22

1.87

SxV

3

1.27

.47

SxPxI

3

.95

SxIxV

3

3.074

SxPxV

3

.874

SxPxIxV

3

6 .28

Error

336

2

Valence of
Consequences

** p

(S)

< .01

(V)

362.27

87

58**

.

.136

.

.77

6

.

15**

11.27**

.

34

1.11
.315

2.67

42

FIGURE

4

Perceived Irresponsibility of the Action
as a Function of Probability Across

Different Stories

Perceived
Irresponsibility
of the Act

4.23
3. 33

High

Low

Probability

43

FIGURE

5

Attributions of Personal Responsibility
to the Actor as a Function of Probability

Across Different Stories

6.14

5.86
5.68

4.86

Responsibility
Attributed
to the Actor

4

.35

2.8

High

Low

Probability

comparisons between the cell means for both measures
showed that the difference between low and high probability

conditions was significant in each of the stories.

Neither of the other two manipulated variables, outcome information or severity of consequences, was found to

affect the attribution of irresponsibility to actions.
It appears then that the prior probability of harm in-

fluences the perceived irresponsibility of an act, but the

severity of whatever consequences ensue does not.
The analysis of variance did reveal that the kind of

outcome information subjects were given influenced the
amount of personal responsibility they assigned to the
actor himself.

Subjects who knew that the actor's be-

havior or neglect produced negative consequences assigned
less responsibility (X = 4.77)

than those who were asked
an accident

to assign responsibility if, hypothetical! y

,

occurred and led to negative outcomes

5.37; F = 10.90,

df = 1/112, p < .01).

can,

(X =

This result suggests that subjects

if instructed to do so,

ignore (or perhaps even over-

compensate for) their knowledge of the consequences of an
actor's conduct when assigning personal responsibility to
him.

A significant interaction between probability and
of
outcome information was also obtained in the analysis

ttributed personal responsibility.

Although subjects

.actors
ystematically assigned more responsibility to

m

the high probability versions of the stories than in the

low probability versions, the discrepancy was greater when
they knew of the actual consequences of the behavior than

when they did not.

Table

9

presents the cell means asso-

ciated with this interaction.
The analysis of variance also provided the clearest
test of the predictions of the defensive hypothesis, as

opposed to those suggested by the information processing
model.

Contrary to the expectations of the defensive

model, and in support of the position proposed here, the

valence of the actual or hypothetical outcome contributed
virtually nothing to the extent of attributed personal
responsibility.

The responsibility assigned for severe

outcomes was substantially the same as for mild outcomes
(X =

5.00 for mild outcomes, 5.14 for severe), nor did out-

come severity have any other significant effects.

Thus,

the valence of the outcome affected neither assignments
of personal responsibility nor the perceived irrespon-

sibility of the act, while the probability manipulation

affected both.
Evidence Concerning the "Creeping Determinism" Effect
the
A secondary purpose of this study was to explore

estimates,
issue of retrospective revisions in probability
There
and the implication for judgments of responsibility.

determinism"
were four opportunities for the "creeping

46

TABLE

9

Average Amount of Responsibility

Assigned to Actors Across Probability
and Outcome Information Conditions

Probability

Uninformed

Informed

Low

4.97

4.02

High

5.76

5.52

effect to obtain in each story.

Subjects estimated the

likelihood of occurrence and the non-occurrence of the
accident, as well as the likelihoods of the two contin-

gent consequences (mild and severe outcomes)

.

There was

no significant effect of the outcome knowledge variable

on any of these estimates.

Table 10 presents the average

likelihood estimates for these parameters under both outcome knowledge conditions.
of results.

It shows no consistent pattern

There was a slight tendency to revise prob-

ability estimates in the predicted direction in three of
the four measures

(probability of occurrence and non-occur-

rence of the accident, and probability of the severe outcome)

.

However, estimates of the likelihood of the mild

outcome show a slight revision in the opposite direction.
Overall, there was no significant tendency to regard

actual outcomes as more inevitable by subjects who knew
that they had occurred.

DISCUSSION
The information processing model of the attribution

process was proposed as an alternative to the defensive

interpretation of attr ibutional judgments.

The defensive

hypothesis asserts that self-serving motives predispose
of
the observer to attend to and base his assignments

conseresponsibility principally on the severity of the

quences which follow from the actor's behavior.

In
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TABLE 10

Effect of Outcome Information
on-

Estimated Likelihoods of Events

Uninformed

Probability of occurrence
of the accident

.48

Probability of occurrence
of the mild consequence

.54

Probability of occurrence
of severe c onsequence

.49

Probability of non-occurrence
of the accident

.52

Informed
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.49

a.

Estimated by those Informed subjects who knew the
Mild outcome occurred.

b.

Estimated by those Informed subjects who knew the
Severe outcome occurred

c.

Since the accident always occurred, the lower estimate
of this parameter by Informed subjects conforms to the
"creeping determinism" prediction

contrast, the model proposed here emphasizes the impor-

tance of the observer's assessment of the act itself in
the context in which it occurs, independent of the severity
of any obtained consequences.

Furthermore, the model

argues that the assessment of the act is a rational, non-

defensive process which principally involves

a

considera-

tion of the probability of foreseeable consequences.

The

results obtained in this study seem to support the alter-

native explanation

According to this interpretation

,

the attribution of

personal responsibility to an actor is the result of

a

series of judgments which begins with an evaluation of
the act itself.

The reasoning which guides this assump-

tion is that the necessary condition for the attribution
of responsibility to an actor is the prior attribution of

irresponsibility to his action.

The judgment of an act's

irresponsibility was postulated to be part of

a

general

evaluation of the act, and the obtained correlation, .88,
confirms this assumption.

Additionally, both the nprrp-ivpd

irresponsibility of the behavior and its general evaluation
were significantly related to its expected-value

.

This

finding validates the usefulness of an expected-value

analysis of behaviors and supports the contention that
subjective,
although evaluative judgments of actions may be

parametersthey can be re-defined in terms of measurable
expectedprobabilities and valences. With respect to the

50

value analysis, it should be noted that an action can have

multiple consequences, each associated with

a

valence.

In this study only two of the possible consequences of an

accident were specified, and none of the positive outcomes

which would accompany the non-occurrence of the accident
were described.

A moderate correlation was obtained

between the expected-value of the act and its global

evaluation using this procedure.

When more of the poten-

tial consequences are included in the calculation of the

expected-value formula,

a

higher correlation could, pre-

sumably, be expected.
Since, according to this information processing model,
the attribution of responsibility to actors reflects, in

large part, the attribution of irresponsibility to his
action, the two measures of "responsibility" were expected
to be related.

this reasoning.

The obtained correlation,

.58,

supports

Furthermore, the results from the analysis

of variance show that the relationship between attributions
to actions and to actors was,

as expected, mediated by

the prior probability of harm.

The positive linear function of probability on
outresponsibility was independent of the severity of the

comes.

of
The lack of any effects due to the seriousness

validity of the
consequences casts further doubt upon the
found to support
defensive hypothesis. No evidence was
to acts or
responsibility
of
attributions
that
claim
the
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actors are influenced by the self serving biases Walster
(1966)

proposed.

These findings serve to support the con-

tention that previous experiments which demonstrated an
effect of the severity manipulation may have confounded
legal responsibility with moral responsibility.

Legal

liability; i.e., the compensation demanded for negligent
conduct, is proportional to the extent of damage incurred.

The proposed model of the attribution process argues that
the assignment of personal responsibility is a moral

decision and does not depend upon the severity of realized
outcomes
However

,

and the obtained findings support that argument

,

both the mild and severe outcomes described in

this study may be considered relatively serious.

Future

research should explore the validity of this model when

a

wider range of outcome severities are involved.
One unanticipated finding was the effect of outcome
knowledge.

Subjects who knew of the actual consequences

of the actor's behavior assigned less personal responsibi-

lity than those who did not.

The "creeping determinism"

hypothesis implies that outcome knowledge may prejudice

responsibility judgments if the probability estimates upon

which they depend are postdictively revised.
such revision was found to occur.

However, no

Furthermore, since the

responobtained effect of outcome knowledge on personal
irresponsibility was not replicated in measures of the
in
sibility of the act, and was, in fact, opposite
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direction to that which would be predicted by the creeping

determinism analysis, this finding should be cautiously
regarded
Overall, the obtained results support the proposed

information processing model.

Based upon these results,

the following picture of the attribution process seems
to emerge.

Assignments of personal responsibility to an

actor are influenced, first of all, by an assessment of the
act itself.

Because the evaluation of the act, and the

degree to which it is perceived to be irresponsible are
defined, in large part, by the probability that the

behavior will lead to an accident, the likelihood of the

accident also greatly affects the extent of personal re-

sponsibility assigned to the perpetrator.

However, the

relationship between personal responsibility and the probability of harm is mediated by another variable which was
not directly measured in this study
of the accident.

the

f oreseeabil

ity

According to the model proposed here,

and consistent with Heider's

(1958)

analysis of the con-

ceptual distinctions between types of responsibility, an

actor will be held morally blameworthy for the negative

consequences of his behavior to the extent that he could
have anticipated those consequences.

Ordinarily, an in-

will also
crease in the probability associated with an event

been
augment the extent to which the event could have
will be
foreseen and thus more personal responsibility
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assigned.

However, the translation between likelihoods

and attributed personal responsibility is not direct.

The ascription of moral culpability depends upon the per-

ceived ability of the actor to have accurately estimated
the probabilities associated with the accident.

Actors

who cannot reasonably be expected to have foreseen the

consequences of their behavior will be held less accountable than those who should have been able to anticipate
the negative effects of their conduct.

This reasoning is

the basis of the common tradition of excusing children

from responsibility.

It also explains the legal tradition

of holding those with "special knowledge" more culpable

than those whose inexperience in a situation deprives them
of the ability to accurately anticipate the consequences
of their behavior or neglect.

This emphasis on

f oreseeability

suggests a reinter-

pretation of findings which purport to demonstrate the

operation of defensive biases in the attribution process
(e.g., McKillip,

1970).

1972;

Shaver, 1970a; Shaver and Carroll,

According to this modification of Walster's (1966)

original hypothesis, it is in the interests of observers
similar misto deny that they too could be involved in

fortunes.

take
This self protective bias leads them to

the age and
into account actor characteristics such as
responsibility
status of perpetrators, and to assign less

themselves.
to actors who are similar to

According to the
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information processing interpretation, on the other hand,

observers consider personal characteristics of the actor
in order to assess his ability to have foreseen the con-

sequences of his behavior.

Responsibility, therefore,

is attributed as a function of perceived

f oreseeability

and not as a function of perceived similarity.

This in-

terpretation is supported by the lack of consistent findings in previous tests of the defensive hypothesis, and
by Shaver's own results in the first experiment in his

1970 study in which attributed responsibility increased

with the age of the actor but was independent of the similarity between actors and observers.

Future research could

profitably be applied to defining the personal and situational characteristics which mitigate the perceived ability
of actors to anticipate the consequences of their actions.

The information processing model proposed here pro-

vides an interpretive framework for analyzing attributions
of responsibility, including the effects of actor-characon
teristics and the severity of outcomes, without relying

defensive interpretations.

Although such self-serving

much
attributions may occasionally occur, it appears that
by
of the attribution process can be explained

motivational information processing analysis.

a

non-
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STORY #1
(Changes appearing in the high probability versions of the

stories are in parentheses.)

The owners of Appalachian Mining Corporation were

planning to open a new coal mine in the mountains of West
Virginia.

The owners had heard about the possibility of

hitting pockets of trapped gas beneath the earth's surface.

When sparks from the mining drills hit trapped gas
sions can occur

If the pocket of gas is small

.

explosion is mild

,

,

,

explo-

the

but usually destroys drilling equipment

Larger pockets of gas are more dangerous

.

If hit they

cause severe explosions which often collapse the mineshafts and kill miners.

Other mining companies had operated successfully in
the area in the past and none of them had hit any pockets
of trapped gas

(but recently some mines had been shut down

because they had hit pockets of trapped gas)

.

Since the

area was known to have large coal deposits the owners of
the Appalachian Mining Corporation went ahead and began

mining.
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OUTCOMES DESCRIBED IN STORY #1

Informed subjects read one of the following outcome de-

scriptions

:

MILD OUTCOME
Seven months after the mine was opened and operating,
the drilling equipment broke through a layer of rock and

hit a small pocket of trapped gas.

The explosion shattered

the drilling equipment but did not injure any of the miners.

SEVERE OUTCOME
Seven months after the mine was opened and operating,
the drilling equipment broke through a layer of rock and
hit a large pocket of trapped gas.

occurred.

A tremendous explosion

The drilling equipment was shattered and 16

miners were killed when the mineshaft collapsed on them.
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Measures of the Probabilities and Valences

Assigned to the Events Described in Story #1
(Informed subjects were asked to respond to the following

questions "as you would have had you not known that the
pocket of trapped gas was hit".)
1.

Opening the mine was
good

-

(Subjects responded
to this item on six

bad

8 -point

unwise

-

justified
safe

2.

-

unjustified

each anchored at the

extremes

unsafe
-

responsible

morally wrong

-

morally right

What is the probability that

a

.

pocket of trapped gas wou

1

How bad or undesirable would it be if

trapped gas were hit?
4.

Semantic Dif-

ferential type scales

irresponsible

be hit?
3.

-

wise

a

pocket of

2

If a pocket of trapped gas were hit, what is the prob-

ability that drilling equipment would be destroyed, but

people would not be hurt?
5.

How undesirable would it be if drilling equipment were

destroyed?

1

All probabilities were measured on 11-point continua,
labelled from 0% to 100%.

2

labelled
All valences were measured on 8-point continua,
at
"not at ail undesirable" and "extremely undesirable"
the extremes

If a pocket of trapped gas were hit, what is the

probability that miners would be killed?
How undesirable would it be if miners were killed?

What is the probability that pockets of trapped gas

would not be hit and that neither drilling equipment
would be destroyed nor would miners be killed?
How desirable or good would it be if pockets of

trapped gas were not hit?
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Measures of the Responsibility 3

Assigned to the Actor in Story #1

Uninformed/Mild Outcome Condition:
Imagine that

a

pocket of trapped gas was hit and

drilling equipment was destroyed, but miners weren't
hurt.

How responsible or blameworthy for that

damage would the mine owners be?^

Uninformed/Severe Outcome Condition:
Imagine that a pocket of trapped gas was hit, equip-

ment was destroyed and miners were killed.

How

responsible for their deaths would the mine owners be?
Informed/Mild Outcome Condition:
We know .that the drilling equipment was destroyed when
the drills hit a small pocket of trapped gas.

How

responsible or blameworthy for that damage are the
mine owners?

Informed/Severe Outcome Condition:
We know that the drilling equipment was destroyed and
16 miners were killed when the drills hit a large

pocket of trapped gas.

How responsible or blameworthy

for their deaths are the mine owners?

"in
All subjects were asked to answer these questions
responsibility,
terms of (the actors) moral and personal
disregarding any legal liability".
on 8-point
All responsibility attributions were measuredand totally
continua, labelled "not at all responsible"
responsible at the extremes.
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STORY #2

Betty was babysitting her

3

year old neighbor,

Monica, while the child's parents were at

a

movie.

her dinner Monica began to play with Betty's dog.

After

Monica

had often played with the dog in the past (the dog was

temperamental and had always avoided the child in the past)

While playing, Monica was pulling the dog's tail and teasing
him, but the dog didn't seem to mind and was, in fact,

very protective of Monica.

(This clause was omitted from

the high probability version.)

Betty thought about putting

the dog outside since she didn't want Monica scratched or

bitten by the dog, but decided it wasn't necessary.
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OUTCOMES DESCRIBED IN STORY #2

MILD OUTCOME

About

h

hour later, while Betty was in the kitchen,

she heard Monica scream.

Betty rushed into the playroom

and found that the dog had become angry and had scratched

Monica's shoulder.
SEVERE OUTCOME

About

%

hour later, while Betty was in the kitchen,

she heard Monica scream.

Betty rushed into the playroom

and found that the dog had become angry and had bitten

Monica's shoulder.
surgery

The wound was severe and required

Measures of the Probabilities and Valences
-

Assigned to the Events Described in Story #2
Leaving the dog in the room with the baby was:
good

-

unwise

bad
-

wise

justified

-

unjustified

safe - unsafe

irresponsible

-

responsible

What is the probability that the child will be hurt
at all by the dog?

How bad or undesirable would it be if the child were

injured by the dog?

What is the probability that the dog will scratch, but
not bite, the child?

How undesirable would it be if the child were scratched,
but not bitten, by the dog?

What is the probability that the dog will bite the
child?

How undesirable would it be if the child were bitten
by the dog?

What is the probability that the child would not be
injured at all by the dog?
not
How good or desirable would it be if the child were

injured at all by the dog?
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Measures of the Responsibility

Assigned to the Actor in Story

#2

Uninformed/Mild Outcome Condition:
Imagine that the child was scratched by the dog.
How responsible or blameworthy for that injury would

Betty be?

Uninformed/Severe Outcome Condition:
Imagine that the child was bitten by the dog

.

How

responsible or blameworthy for that injury would
Betty be?

Informed/Mild Outcome Condition
We know that Monica was scratched by the dog

.

How

responsible or blameworthy for that injury is Betty?

Informed/Severe Outcome Condition:
We know that Monica was bitten by the doq.

How

responsible or blameworthy for that injury is Betty?
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STORY #3

The state of Colorado voted to build a dam on the

Platte River in order to store more water for the growing
city of Denver.

Before the dam was completed, William

Smith and his family decided to build

a

house on land they

owned near the banks of the Platte River, downstream of
the proposed dam site.

Mr. Smith knew that the Platte

had never flooded before (that the Platte had flooded
times in the past eight years)

.

3

If the river flooded be-

fore the dam was completed, it could ruin the house and en-

danger the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their three
children.

Mr.

Smith knew that Spring rainfall was, on

the average, decreasing every year (and that the Platte

hadn't flooded since 1973)

so it seemed highly unlikely

that the river would flood (again) before the dam was
built.

house

With this in mind, he went ahead and built the
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OUTCOMES DESCRIBED IN STORY #3

'

MILD OUTCOME
A few months after the Smith family moved into their

new home and before the dam was completed, the Platte
River flooded.

Although none of the Smiths were injured

in the flood, the house was ruined.

SEVERE OUTCOME
A few months after the Smith family moved into their

new home and before the dam was completed, the Platte

River flooded.

The house was ruined and two members of

the Smith family were critically injured as the flood

swept through their house.
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Measures of the Probabilities and Valences
.

Assigned to Events Described in Story
1.

Building the house before the dam was completed was:
good

-

unwise

bad
-

justified
safe

-

wise
-

unjustified

unsafe

irresponsible
2.

#3

-

responsible

What is the probability that the river will flood before the dam is completed?

3.

How bad or undesirable would it be if the river were to
flood?

4.

If the river were to flood, what is the probability

that the house would be damaged, but none of the family

would be injured?
5.

How undesirable would it be if the house was damaged,
but the family was not injured?

6.

If the river were to flood, what is the probability

that the house would be damaged and some of Mr.

Smith's family would be injured.
7.

How undesirable would it be if the house was damaged
and some of the family were injured?

8.

What is the probability that the river would not flood
before the dam was completed?

9.

did not
How good or desirable would it be if the river

flood?

Measures of the Responsibility

Assigned to the Actor in Story

#3

Uninformed/Mild Outcome Condition:
Imagine that the house was damaged by a flood, but
none of the family was injured.

How responsible

or blameworthy would Mr. Smith be for that damage?

Uninformed/Severe Outcome Condition:
Imagine that the house was damaged and some members
of the family were injured in a flood.

How respon-

sible or blameworthy would Mr. Smith be for those

damages and injuries?

Informed/Mild Outcome Condition:
We know that the house was ruined in the flood.

How

responsible or blameworthy for that damage is Mr.
Smith?

Informed/Severe Outcome Condition:
We know that the house was ruined and two members of
his family were critically injured when the river

flooded.

How responsible or blameworthy for that

damage and those injuries is Mr. Smith?

STORY #4

John Shaw,

a

17 year old youth,

charged with arson.

was arrested and

He confessed to setting fire to a

neighbor's garage and was in court to hear his sentence.
As is customary, the judge asked for the recommendations

of the defense attorney and the prosecuting attorney.

John Shaw's attorney told the judge that the boy had set
fire to the garage only because some schoolmates had dared

him to do it.

The attorney also noted that damage to the

garage had been relatively minor and that no one had been
hurt, and that Shaw had promised to work after school to

pay for all the damage he had caused.

Furthermore, the

attorney told the judge that the boy had
in the community.

a

good reputation

He was a good student and had never been

in any kind of trouble before.

(The previous two sentences

were omitted from the high probability version.)

The

attorney said that Shaw's actions could best be regarded
as a foolish prank and urged the judge to put Shaw on

probation
The prosecuting attorney argued that John Shaw was too

dangerous to be out on the streets.

(He advised the judge

that Shaw had been in the same kind of trouble before.
was 13.
Shaw's first contact with the police came when he

with matches
He had started a brush fire while playing

behind his house.
a

Later when he was 15, Shaw had started

fire in his school's auditorium.

He was also responsible
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for another fire in the town library one year later.)

The prosecutor said that Shaw's actions were an indication
of the boy's lack of concern for the lives and property

of other people.

The prosecutor argued that Shaw might

some day set fire to another building and injure or kill

other people.

With this in mind, he urged the judge to

send Shaw to the Youth Correctional Facility for one year

where he could be kept under supervision and given whatever psychiatric help he needed.

r

74

OUTCOMES DESCRIBED IN STORY

"

#4

MILD OUTCOME
The judge ordered John Shaw put on probation for one

year instead of sending him to the state correctional
facility.

Four months after his appearance in Court,

John Shaw set fire to a warehouse in the business district
of the town.

No one was in the building at the time, but

the warehouse was extensively damaged.

SEVERE OUTCOME
The judged ordered John Shaw put on probation for one

year instead of sending him to the state correctional
facility.

Four months after his appearance in Court, John

Shaw set fire to a warehouse in the business district of
the town.

The building was extensively damaged and two

men working in the warehouse died in the blaze.

Measures of the Probabilities and Valences

Assigned to the Events Described in Story

#4

Letting John Shaw return to the community without
sending him to the state facility for supervision and

psychiatric care was:
good - bad

unwise

-

wise

justified

-

unjustified

safe - unsafe

irresponsible

-

responsible

What is the probability that Shaw will commit arson
again?
How bad or undesirable would it be if Shaw commits

arson again?
If he does commit arson again, what is the probability

that he will set fire to an unoccupied building?

How undesirable would it be if Shaw damaged or destroyed
an unoccupied building?
If he does commit arson again, what is the probability

that people would be injured or killed in the fire?

How undesirable would it be if people were injured or

killed in such a fire?

What is the probability that Shaw will not commit
arson again?
did not
How desirable or good would it be if Shaw

commit arson again?
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Measures of the Responsibility

Assigned to the Actor in Story

#4

Uninformed/Mild Outcome Condition:
Imagine that John Shaw did commit arson again and an

unoccupied building was damaged or destroyed.

How

responsible or blameworthy for that damage would the
judge be because he let Shaw return to the community

without supervision or psychiatric care?

Uninformed/Severe Outcome Condition:
Imagine that John Shaw did commit arson again and

people were injured or killed in the fire.

How re-

sponsible or blameworthy for the injuries or deaths

would the judge be because he let Shaw return to the
community without supervision or psychiatric care?
Informed/Mild Outcome Condition:
We know that John Shaw did commit arson again and

warehouse was destroyed.

a

How responsible for that

damage is the judge because he let Shaw return to the
community without supervision or psychiatric care?

Informed/Severe Outcome Condition:
We know that John Shaw did commit arson again and a

building was destroyed and two men were killed in the
fire.

How responsible or blameworthy for that damage

Shaw
and their deaths is the judge because he let
psyreturn to the community without supervision or

chiatric care?

